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Case No. 20090814 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
RUDD MARTIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
J. X 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (West Supp. 
2007). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West 2009). Defendant was also convicted of operating a vehicle without an 
ignition interlock system, but he does not challenge that conviction on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's jury conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine? 
Standard of Review. "The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is 
highly deferential to the jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 29,122 
P.3d 639. The appellate court "begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all 
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict/7 Id. (citation omitted). The Court "will reverse a jury verdict only if 
[it] determine[s] that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict/" Id. 
(citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES1 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (ii) (West Supp. 2010) 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or 
the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, 
as distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and 
includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled 
substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled 
substance, ... it is sufficient if it is shown that ... the controlled 
substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion 
and control over it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010) 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or 
use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless 
it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; .... 
1
 The State cites to the current versions of the relevant statutory 
provisions. Amendments to those provisions subsequent to the date of the 
offenses in this case were not substantive. 
.? -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information with (1) burglary, a second degree 
felony; (2) possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony; (3) theft, a 
class B misdemeanor; (4) criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor; (5) violating 
a "no alcohol" driver's license restriction, a class B misdemeanor; and 
(6) operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock system, a class B 
misdemeanor. R.2-1,165-64. A preliminary hearing was held and Defendant 
was bound over to district court to stand trial. R.25-24. On Defendant's motion, 
the trial court ordered that counts 2 (possession of methamphetamine), 5 
(violation of driver's license alcohol restriction), and 6 (operating a vehicle 
without an ignition interlock device) "be severed from the remaining counts and 
tried jointly." R.199-95. The trial court, however, dismissed count 5 on the 
State's motion and Defendant was thereafter tried before a jury on counts 2 and 
6. See R.248-47; R.294:113. 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, counsel for Defendant moved for a 
directed verdict on the possession of methamphetamine charge for insufficient 
evidence, but the motion was denied. See R.294:145-48. Defendant thereafter 
testified in his defense and the prosecution recalled the two responding officers 
in rebuttal. See R.294:149-63. The jury found Defendant guilty of both counts. 
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R.250-49. On August 11, 2009, the trial court entered judgment against 
Defendant, sentencing him to concurrent terms of zero-to-five years for 
possession of methamphetamine and 180 days for driving without an ignition 
interlock system. R.268-67. On September 14, 2009, Defendant filed a notice of 
appeal. R.273-71. Although the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days 
after judgment, the same was timely under the trial court's order granting 
Defendant's motion for an extension pursuant to rule 4(e), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See R.274,270-69. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 20, 2007, Sergeant Edwin Christensen and Officer Kevin 
Turner were dispatched to a Saratoga Springs residence on a welfare check. 
R.294:66-67,91. On reaching the location, they made contact with Defendant, 
who was sitting in a truck parked nearby. R.294: 67-68,70,91. Defendant told 
the officers that the truck was a work vehicle and that he had driven it there 
from Eagle Mountain. R.294:69-70,92,156. While speaking with Defendant, the 
officers smelled "an odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his person." 
R.294:68,91. Officer Turner ran a computer check on Defendant and discovered 
that his driver's license was subject to an ignition interlock device restriction. 
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R.294:69,72,92. Peering into the truck, the officers saw that it did not have the 
required device and they thereafter arrested Defendant. R.294:70-73,75,93-95. 
In making the arrest, Sergeant Christensen handcuffed Defendant with his 
hands behind his back and searched his person incident to arrest. R.294:74-
75,77,94-95,118,160. He patted down Defendant's outer clothing and checked 
his waistband and pockets, but found no weapons or contraband. R.294:77-
80,117. Sergeant Christensen later acknowledged that he has occasionally failed 
to discover contraband in a search incident to arrest that was later uncovered in 
a subsequent search. R.294:82,84-85. 
After Sergeant Christensen's search of Defendant's person, Officer Turner 
placed Defendant in the backseat of his patrol car. R.294:75,95. While sitting in 
the driver's seat before leaving, Officer Turner felt the car "kind of moving." 
R.294:96,119,126-27,162-63. He looked back and saw Defendant "leaning 
forward and fidgeting around." R.294:96,152. Defendant's movements were so 
pronounced that Officer Turner believed he had "bumped his head on the ... 
cage that separates the front seats from the back seats." R.294:96. Officer Turner 
told Defendant to sit still, but Defendant continued. R.294:127. Suspecting that 
Defendant might be trying to remove his handcuffs or hide something, Officer 
Turner exited the driver's seat to verify what Defendant was doing. R.294:97. 
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When Officer Turner opened the backseat passenger door, he saw 
Defendant's handcuffed hands "reached back around" his waist, with his left 
hand "in his left front pants pocket," and change spilt onto the cushion and 
floor. R.294:97,120,128,157-58. Officer Turner asked Defendant what he was 
doing, but Defendant did not answer. R.294:98,163. Officer Turner then 
removed Defendant from the vehicle, collected the spilt change, and searched 
the backseat. R.294:98-99. He found a small plastic baggy of methamphetamine 
"tucked ... just barely under the backrest" of the seat where Defendant's hands 
had originally been. R.294:99,101,120,140-43. When he lifted the baggy up, 
Defendant protested that it was not his, that he had already been searched, and 
asked to be tested. R.294:122,124-25,154. 
Pursuant to department policy, Officer Turner searches the backseat of his 
patrol car at the beginning of each shift and after transporting any prisoner to 
the jail. R.294:89-90. In doing so, he removes the bottom cushion and also runs 
his hand down the crack where the cushion meats the backrest. R.294:90. At the 
beginning of his shift on November 20,2010, Officer Turner searched his patrol 
car as per policy and found nothing. See R.294:90,98. Defendant was the first 
person placed in the backseat of his patrol car that day. R.294:98,102. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence from a jury verdict, this 
Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict. The Court will not reverse 
unless the evidence, so viewed, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable 
that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty. The evidence in this 
case was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Defendant 
possessed methamphetamine. Officer Turner testified that he found the baggy 
of methamphetamine in the very location of Defendant's handcuffed hands 
when he was placed in the backseat. He further testified that he had searched 
the backseat of his police car at the beginning of the shift and that Defendant 
was the first person to be placed there that day. Moreover, after Defendant was 
seated in the car, he began moving and fidgeting around. When Officer Turner 
opened the backseat door to see what he was doing, Defendant's handcuffed 
hands were stretched around his waist, with his left hand in his front pocket. 
Finally, Defendant's trial explanation that he was trying to get comfortable was 
implausible given the contorted positioning of his hands. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY POSSESSED 
METH AMPHETAMINE 
After the State rested its case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on 
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. R.294:145-48. The trial court denied the 
motion and the jury thereafter found Defendant guilty. R.250; R.294:148,217-18. 
On appeal, Defendant challenges the jury verdict, arguing that "the evidence 
introduced at trial was insufficient to establish the necessary nexus between him 
and the drugs to justify his conviction [for] possession of methamphetamine/7 
Aplt. Brf. at 9. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict and this Court should thus affirm. 
* * * 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence from a jury verdict, this 
Court "accord[s] high deference to the fact-finder at trial." State v. Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22, | 38, 70 P.3d 111. The Court thus "reviewfs] the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the 
verdict." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993). It "'dotes] not weigh 
conflicting evidence,' nor [does it] 'substitute [its] judgment for that of the fact-
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finder/'7 Id. at f 38 (citations omitted). If there is conflicting evidence, the Court 
"must 'accept that version of events'" which supports the verdict. People v. 
Maury, 68 P.3d 1, 30 (Cal. 2003) (citation omitted). This Court "will reverse a 
criminal conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). 
In this case, Defendant was tried for "knowingly and intentionally ... 
possess [ing] ... a controlled substance," in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010). The State was thus required to establish that 
Defendant wTas either in "actual physical possession" or in "constructive 
possession" of the baggy of methamphetamine found in the backseat of the 
police car. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Utah 1985). Defendant has 
assumed, as did the prosecutor below, see R.294:194, that because the officers did 
not find the methamphetamine on his person, the State's case rested on a theory 
of constructive possession. See Aplt. Brf. at 10. 
A person is said to be in "constructive possession" of an object when he or 
she does not have actual physical possession of the item, but nevertheless has 
"both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over [it]." Fox, 
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709 P.2d at 319. Typically, the doctrine of constructive possession is used to 
establish possession of drugs found in a location occupied by multiple people. 
See, e.g. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,122 P.3d 639 (finding live-in girl friend to 
be in constructive possession of meth lab in apartment where she and her 
boyfriend lived). The doctrine is also used in cases where the defendant is 
absent or separated from the place where the drugs are found. See, e.g. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316 (finding owner/occupant to be in constructive possession of marijuana 
growing at home even though he was no longer there). 
Nevertheless, "actual possession and constructive possession ... often so 
shade into one another that it is difficult to say where one ends and the other 
begins." Natl Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914). For example, the 
actual theory in this case wras that Defendant had actual physical possession of 
the baggy of methamphetamine when he was arrested, but that he discarded it 
in the police car in an attempt to avoid drug charges at the jail. See R.294:54-59. 
In the end, however, the distinction between actual physical possession and 
constructive possession matters little. To establish either, the State must 
demonstrate that "the drugs were subject to the defendant's dominion and 
control and the defendant had the intent to exercise that control." State v. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, \ 16, 985 P.2d 911. 
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When drugs are found on a defendant's person, the fact of physical 
possession is direct evidence of the defendant's "power and intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. But when the 
defendant is not present at the time drugs are found, or when drugs are found 
in close proximity to more than one person, the State must rely on other facts to 
establish "the necessary nexus" between the defendant and the contraband. 
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ]f 10,975 P.2d 501. The same is true 
when the State is establishing prior actual physical possession. 
"Whether a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug exists 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
Factors that may be relevant in determining possession "include[e] ownership 
and/or occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the drugs were found, 
presence of defendant at the time [the] drugs were found, defendant's proximity 
to the drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, [and] 
presence of drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control." Workman, 
2005 UT 66, [^ 32. These considerations, however, "are not 'universally 
pertinent,'" and the list is not exhaustive. Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79, f^ f 
14-15). A review of the record in this case reveals that the jury had ample 
evidence to support a finding of possession. 
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Officer Turner testified that after removing Defendant from the police car, 
he found a baggy of methamphetamine "tucked ... just barely under the 
backrest/' in the location "right where [Defendant's] hands were when they 
were handcuffed behind his back." R.294:99,101-02. Defendant's proximity to 
the drugs just prior to their discovery was the threshold fact in the State's case 
establishing a nexus between Defendant and the drugs. See Workman, 2005 UT 
66,1f 29 (holding that "presence of drugs in a specific area where the defendant 
had control" is an important factor in establishing the necessary nexus). 
Because countless others had undoubtedly ridden in the backseat of the 
police car, proximity alone was not enough to establish possession. See State v. 
Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,1388 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing that mere presence in 
automobile is generally not sufficient alone to establish possession where access 
or occupancy is not exclusive). Accordingly, the State's evidence also 
established that Officer Turner searched the backseat of his patrol car at the 
beginning of his shift on November 20, 2007: he "r[a]n [his] hand across ... the 
crack of the backrest" of the backseat and "tug[ged] up on the bottom cushion, 
... pop[ping] it right out," allowing him to "see ... the metal floor of the vehicle 
all underneath the cushion." R.294:90. Moreover, he testified that Defendant 
was the first person to be placed in the backseat that day. R.294:99,101-02. This 
testimony created a strong inference that Defendant, not a prior detainee, had 
placed the drugs in the backseat. 
The foregoing testimony — establishing that the police car was searched at 
the beginning of the shift, that Defendant was the first person to be placed in the 
backseat, and that methamphetamine was discovered where he had been sitting 
after his removal from the car— was more than sufficient to support the jury's 
finding that Defendant possessed the drugs. 
Under the State's theory, Sergeant Christensen missed finding the drugs 
on Defendant when he searched him incident to arrest, and Sergeant 
Christensen admitted at trial that he has on occasion missed finding drugs when 
conducting a search incident to arrest. See R.294:82,84-85. In contrast, the 
defense theorized that it was Officer Turner who missed finding the drugs when 
he searched the car at the beginning of his shift. To accept this version of events, 
however, the jury would have been required to not only find that the drugs 
were overlooked during Officer Turner's search of the car, but that they were 
also overlooked in the search of the car by the officer from the previous shift. 
The State, however, produced additional evidence that it was Defendant who 
had placed the drugs in the car. 
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Officer Turner further testified that while sitting in the front seat, he felt 
the car "kind of moving" and turned to see Defendant "leaning forward and 
fidgeting around." R.294:96,152. Defendant's movements were so pronounced 
that Officer Turner believed Defendant had "bumped his head on the ... cage 
that separates the front seats from the back seats." R.294:96. Officer Turner told 
Defendant to sit still, but his conduct persisted. R.294:96,127. Suspecting that he 
might be trying to remove his handcuffs or hide something, Officer Turner 
exited the car, opened the backseat door, and saw Defendant's handcuffed 
hands "reached back around" his waist, with his left hand "in his left front pants 
pocket," and change spilt onto the cushion and floor. R.294:97,120,128,157-58. 
Such "suspicious or incriminating behavior" was yet another fact "linking or 
tending to link" Defendant to the methamphetamine, Solas, 820 P.2d at 1388. 
Officer Turner additionally testified that when he opened the passenger 
door and saw Defendant's handcuffed hands "reached back around" his waist, 
Defendant did not answer. See R.294:97-98,120,128,154,157-58,163. But then at 
trial, Defendant claimed that he was simply trying to get comfortable because 
his wrists hurt. See R.294:152. Given the contorted positioning of Defendant's 
handcuffed hands when Officer Turner opened the door, the jury could 
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reasonably view Defendant's trial explanation as far-fetched and nothing more 
than a post hoc fabrication. 
Additionally, although Defendant denied ownership when he saw Officer 
Turner hold up the baggy, R.294:122,124-25,154, the jury could reasonably treat 
that denial as incriminating because it was an indication of Defendant's 
awareness of the character of the drugs. See State v. Gordon, 2007 UT App 66U, 
*2 (finding that defendant made incriminating statements where he initially 
denied knowing what was in the tin and then later yelling that it was not his 
crack cocaine). 
In sum, the State introduced evidence that Defendant had secreted the 
baggy of methamphetamine in the backseat of the patrol car —the car was 
searched at the beginning of the shift, Defendant was moving around after he 
was seated in the vehicle, his left hand was in his front pocket, and 
methamphetamine was then found where he had been sitting. This evidence 
was not "so weak that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 18, 210 P.3d 288. 
Although Defendant presented a different theory of events, "[t]he jury chose to 
believe" the evidence in support of the State's case, and this Court "will not 
second guess its judgment." State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ^ 19,42 P.3d 1248. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction 
for possession of methamphetamine. 
Respectfully submitted November 19, 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
' S.GRAY 
distant Attornev General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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